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Approved For Release 2003/07/08 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400020022-8

SECURITY INFORMATION

SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS OF PY STAFF

Paragraph I.1., page 1:

This appears to beg the issue. If this paragraph is to be retained, your staff recommends that those areas of "basic national policy" which are said to require clarification be specified. However, your staff would prefer to see the following substituted:

"1. To be fully effective, psychological planning at the strategic level should be based on an agreed over-all strategic concept for the national psychological effort. Efforts to date indicate that such a concept cannot be formulated without a thorough study of existing national policy, interdepartmental agreement as to the interpretation thereof, and, possibly, additional policy decision. This is a time consuming process, and, accordingly, the formulation of a strategic concept may not be possible for some time."

Paragraph I.1., page 2:

Your staff questions the validity of the conclusion set forth in the first sentence and recommends that the sentence be preceded by the words: "In certain limited areas,".

Paragraph I.A., page 3:

Your staff recommends that, the first complete paragraph on page 3, commencing, "In the Middle East," be rewritten as follows:

"Irresponsible nationalism is the current major threat to free world interests in the area. United States capabilities for effective psychological action have declined, though some slow progress

is reported in certain sections of the Moslem World."

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In subparagraph 1, of the last paragraph on page 3, your staff feels that Western Europe should not be singled out. The statement that the U. S. label has damaging effects is possibly even more applicable to areas such as the Middle East. Accordingly, it is recommended that the words, "particularly, but not solely Western Europe," be deleted.

Paragraph I.B., page 5:

The first sentence is so worded that it might misrepresent what appears to be the real picture. The following is suggested as a substitute:

"The Soviet grip in the Communist-dominated areas of Europe and of the Far East appeared to be even firmer at the end of the fiscal year 1952 than at the beginning."

The following is suggested as a rewrite of the first sentence of the last complete paragraph on page 5:

"In the overt propaganda field behind the Iron Curtain, the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe appear to be the only significant remaining programs which effectively reach the peoples of either or both the USSR and the satellites."

Annex B -- Summary of the Report of the Department of Defense

With respect to the section on page 5 dealing with Department of Defense comments on "Deficiencies in the National Psychological Program," your staff takes exception to subparagraphs (1) and (2) of the last paragraph on page 5 on the following grounds:

(1) In view of

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(1) In view of the "hate America" and the biological warfare campaigns, the less said about this subject at this time, the better.

However, propaganda material should now be prepared as a contingency measure which could effectively be released at such time as the President, or other properly constituted Government authority, deems advisable.


(2) The frequent "flexing of our atomic muscles" has tended to worry a good many of our friends. Your staff considers that further headline publicity about our atomic prowess would be following a very questionable line of policy. (Total Soviet silence about its own atomic capabilities has kept many people guessing.)

The most that seems to be required at this time is an occasional guarded but reassuring statement to the effect that the U. S. national interest, with respect to atomic weapons, is being effectively safeguarded.

Finally, Defense considers that the national psychological program could be developed to provide for more adequate support of the national military effort by establishing national objectives and clarifying department and agency responsibilities governing psychological operations during the cold war. Defense also states that it could render more effective support to the national program if the military establishment's wartime potentials were exploited to the maximum during the cold war period.

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MISSING PAGE

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

Enclosure # 2

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